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Four Decades of Federal Civil
Rights Litigation
Theodore Eisenberg*
1. INTRODUCTION
Civil rights litigation has been a prominent part of the federal docket in the
decades since Dr. King's speech. The speech came in the midst of two seminal events
in the modern history of civil rights legislation: (1) the 1961 decision in Monroe v.
Pape' that revitalized using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress constitutional violations by
state officials, and (2) a statutory achievement of the civil rights movement, passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 19642 with its prohibition in Title VII' against private employment
discrimination.
Section 1983 cases, often referred to as constitutional tort cases, and employment
discrimination cases, including Title VII cases, numerically dominate the civil rights case
docket in federal court. There are, of course, other important statutes designed to
protect civil rights. These include the ban on race discrimination in federally funded
programs in Title VI of the 1964 Act,' the ban on sex discrimination in education programs or activities that receive federal funding in Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972,' the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,' the Americans with

*Theodore Eisenberg (1947-2014).
Ted prepared a draft of this article incident to his participation in a New York Law School Law Review Symposium
in 2013. Ted tragically passed away prior to this article's completion. Professors Kevin Clermont, Dawn Chutkow, and
Michael Heise assisted with bringing Ted's article to completion and publication. Els Baum provided outstanding

research assistance to this effort.
'365 U.S. 167 (1961).
'Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (enacted July 2, 1964).
'42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
442 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq.
542 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
629 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.
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Disabilities Act of 1990,1 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,8 the Equal Pay Act of 1963,' the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,10 and surviving civil rights statutes from the post-Civil War
era." The Civil Rights Act of 1968," which prohibits discrimination in housing, was
enacted shortly after the assassination of Dr. King. For the last four decades, however,
litigation under Section 1983 and the employment statutes has constituted the largest
fraction of the nonprisoner federal civil docket.' This article examines the pattern of
trials, their outcomes, and settlements in these two areas from 1979 to 2013.
From the beginning of the modern civil rights era of litigation in the 1960s, concerns
have been expressed about the treatment of civil rights litigants in court. Kevin Clermont
and Stewart Schwab found that federal employment discrimination plaintiffs, compared to
non-civil rights plaintiffs, "manage fewer resolutions early in litigation, and so they have to
proceed to trial more often. They win a lower proportion of cases during pretrial and at
trial. . . . On appeal, they have a harder time both in preserving their successes and in
reversing adverse outcomes."" Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert Nelson, and Ryon Lancaster's
classic study of federal employment discrimination cases filed from 1988 to 2003 showed
that employment discrimination cases suffered 19 percent early dismissals and 18 percent
losses on summary judgment.'" Figure 1, based on Nielsen et al.'s similar figure, shows the
pattern of employment case disposition.

'42

U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.

829 U.S.C. §§ 791 et seq.
129 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
'042 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. (invalidated in part by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)).
"42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981, 1982, 1985 (2006).

`42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
1

3E.g., U.S. Courts, Caseload Statistics 2013: Table C-2, U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2012 and 2013, available

at <http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/utscourts/Statistics/FederaludicialCaseloadStatistics/2013/tables/

CO2Marl3.pdf>. For fiscal year 2013, these data show 14,078 employment filings, 2,020 Americans with Disabilities Act
employment filings, and 16,405 other civil rights filings in federal district court. Only prisoner case categories (habeas
corpus and prison conditions) had comparable or greater numbers of filings. Id. Overlap exists among the civil rights
case categories. For example, an employment race discrimination case against a state employer could be filed under
Section 1983 and Title VII. The court data's classification of a case is based on the classification of it by the attorney
at the time of filing. For discussion of civil rights action cause of action overlap, see Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart

J. Schwab, Comment, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 596, 601 tbl.lII (1988) (showing that cases
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 include employment cases that could also be Title VII cases, and police misconduct cases
that could also be Section 1983 cases).
"Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to

Worse? 3 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 103, 103 (2009).
"Laura

Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?

Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7J. Empirical Legal Stud. 175 (2010).
This study was significant because it provided detailed procedural stage information that was previously unavailable.
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Figure 1: The paths of federal employment discrimination cases: a sequential model of
outcomes, 1988-2003.
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The 58 percent total settlement rate for employment cases is well below the settlement rate in other areas of law. Studies report settlement rates of 73 percent in federal
7
non-civil-rights cases, 75 percent in tort cases,' 6 and 70-80 percent in general.' Of 1,672
cases filed, 32, about 2 percent, resulted in plaintiff wins at trial compared to 4 percent for

"Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care? 6J. Empirical
Legal Stud. 111, 119 (non-civil-rights cases), 120 (tort cases) (2009).
7

Id. at 122-23.
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defendants." This one-third trial win rate is below that of most other civil litigation.19 Other
studies show that, on appeal, employment discrimination plaintiffs fare worse than almost
every other kind of case. 20
Similar patterns exist for constitutional tort cases brought under Section 1983. No
study of Section 1983 contains case outcome data as precisely coded as Nielsen et al.'s
outcome data for employment cases. Nevertheless, it is clear that Section 1983 plaintiffs also
fare poorly compared to non-civil-rights plaintiffs. Pretrial judgment rates for plaintiffs are
lower than in other classes of cases, 2 ' pretrial dismissal rates are higher than for other class
of cases 22 and have plaintiff trial win rates of 30 percent or less, which is lower than the rates
for most classes of civil litigation." Constitutional tort cases have settlement rates well below
the 70-80 percent rate in non-civil-rights cases." On appeal, plaintiffs in constitutional tort
litigation who succeeded at trial suffer much higher reversal rates, over 50 percent, than
defendants in constitutional tort cases who prevailed at trial, who suffer reversal in less than
25

20 percent of appeals by plaintiffs.

Employment discrimination and Section 1983 plaintiffs not only have suffered
longstanding worse results than other plaintiffs. Both classes of plaintiffs suffered increased
pretrial dismissal rates relative to other plaintiffs after the Supreme Court's heightening of
pleading standards in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.2" The negative effect was especially
strong in pro se cases.2 1

"Nielsen et al., supra note 15, at 187.
"See Figure 6 (showing higher trial win rates in federal tort and contract cases).
2

Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-

Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, I J. Empirical Legal Stud. 659 (2004); Theodore Eisenberg &Henry S. Farber, Why Do
Plaintiffs Lose Appeals? Biased Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates? 15 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 73

(2013).
2

Theodore Eisenberg, The Relationship Between Plaintiff Success Rates Before Trial and at Trial, 154

J.

Royal

Statistical Soc'y 111, 115-16 (1991).
22

Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court, available at <http://ssrn.com/

abstract=2347360>.
"See Figure 6; StewartJ. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of
the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 719, 728, 733 (1988).
2

2

Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 16, at 122, 133.
Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 20, at 99.

2`550 U.S. 544 (2007) (dismissing an antitrust complaint that alleged an agreement in conclusory terms based on
information and belief, with the lack of detail owing to the fact that the plaintiffs had no proof in hand without

discovery). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), clarified the broad applicability of Tivombly and the intricate
workings of the new plausibility test. For the adverse affect of these cases on employment discrimination and Section
1983 plaintiffs, see, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 22.
2

Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 22.
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The last broad-based empirical assessment of employment cases was Clermont and
Schwab's 2009 study, which ended with data from 2006. No similar recent summary exists
for Section 1983 cases, though patterns over time for some outcomes have been reported
for earlier years.2 1 With data through fiscal year 2013 now available, it is appropriate
to again examine the long-term litigation patterns for both employment cases and
constitutional tort cases, collectively referred to in this article as "civil rights cases." Except
when reporting data on all terminations, this analysis does not include prisoner civil rights
29

cases.

To summarize what follows, civil rights cases constitute about 14 percent of federal
court civil terminations, which constitutes a decline from a peak of about 17 percent in the
late 1990s.o Trial outcomes, as in other areas of law, constitute a small fraction of case
terminations." The distribution of employment discrimination trials between judge trials
and jury trials has changed over time.32 The number of employment discrimination trials
before judges has been in decline for about 30 years, a trend also evident in contract and
tort cases." Pretrial dismissals partly explain the striking decline in the number of trials. In
calendar year 2012, there were 39 employment discrimination judge trials compared to a
peak of 1,008 judge trials in 1984." Employment jury trials declined from a 1997 peak of
851 to 264 in 2012, the lowest since 1983." The number ofjudge trials in constitutional tort
cases has declined from 395 in 1982 and 1983 to 55 in 2012.36 Constitutional tort cases had
570 trials in 1998 and 463 in 2012."
The number of employment trials before juries increased substantially after the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 but has been in decline since 1997.38 In consti-

"Theodore Eisenberg, Civil Rights Legislation: Cases and Materials (5th ed. 2004).
'Cases brought by prisoners have their own AO numeric code numbers and can be separated from nonprisoner
cases.
"oSee Figure 3.
"Figure 2 shows a fairly steady number of constitutional tort terminations since the late 1990s and a peak of
employment discrimination filings in the late 1990s followed by a decade-long decline in their number. Figure 4
shows a long-term decline in the number ofjudge trials and no increase in the number ofjury trials; so the rate of
trials has been in long-term decline.
3

"See Figure 5.
"See Figure 4.
"Id.
35

Id.

'Id.
7

3 Id.
8

1d.
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tutional tort cases, the number ofjudge trials has been declining steadily for about 30 years;
the number ofjury trials has been reasonably constant over that time period.3" Civil rights
plaintiff win rates at trial have been steady in both judge trials and jury trials for at least a
decade.40 The success of civil rights litigation, as measured by trial win rates and settlement
rates, has been quite low compared to contract and tort cases.' Median awards in civil rights
trials have increased more than the rate of inflation but median trial awards in both
constitutional tort cases and employment cases are below the awards in contract cases and
tort cases.

42

The patterns over time suggest an important shift in the nature of employment cases
being filed. The declining number of employment cases over time and an increase in
employment case settlement rates over time are evidence that plaintiffs, or their attorneys,
are shifting the profile of cases filed. This is likely in response to low success rates and
doctrinal development such as Twombly-Iqbal. The pattern differs somewhat for constitutional tort cases. After almost tripling in the number of terminations from 1979 to 2004, the
number of constitutional tort terminations has since been in decline. Settlement rates in
constitutional tort cases and employment cases were similar until the late 1980s but then
separated, with lower settlement rates in constitutional tort cases ever since. Constitutional
tort case settlement rates have been increasing since the early 1990s but have not achieved
the distinct historical highs that employment cases are achieving. This may be evidence that
constitutional tort plaintiffs, or their lawyers, have reacted differently to low success rates
than have employment discrimination litigants. The Supreme Court's hostility to constitutional tort plaintiffs may be more difficult for attorneys to accept and adjust to than its
treatment of employment claims. Cases such as the Court's shielding of conscious
prosecutorial misbehavior that leads to wrongful death sentences for innocent people,
and shielding people who conduct admittedly unconstitutional strip-searches of innocent
schoolchildren,44 may have been difficult to forecast even for a Court regarded as being
extremely conservative.
Section II of this article describes the data. Section III provides a more detailed
presentation of the results, which are discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes.

"9Id.
40

See Figure 6.

41

With respect to trial win rates, see id. With respect to settlement rates, see Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 16, at
143.

4

4

See Figure 9.
'Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (5-4 decision).

"Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
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II.

THE DATA

To explore the litigation patterns, I use the computerized Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts (AO) data, assembled by the Federal Judicial Center, and disseminated by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research." These data include all cases
terminated in the federal courts since fiscal year 1970, but this study covers 1979 through
2013. In 1979, the AO started to include in the data whether judgment was entered for
plaintiff or defendant. I use the data from 1979 through September 2013, the most recent
time for which data are available as of this writing. To help place the results for these two
civil rights areas in perspective, I also report results for contract cases and for personal
injury tort cases in federal district courts.46
When a civil case terminates in a federal district court, the court clerk transmits to the
AO information about the case, including the names of the parties, the subject matter
category (chosen from about 100 case categories, including specific branches of civil rights,
contract, tort, and other areas of law) and the jurisdictional basis of the case (the United
States as a party, federal question jurisdiction, or diversity jurisdiction), the case's origin in
the district as original or removed or transferred, the dates of filing and termination in the
district court, the procedural stage of the case at termination, the procedural method of
disposition, and, if the court entered judgment or reached a decision, the prevailing party
and the relief granted. The computerized database contains over 9,745,605 district court
civil case outcomes from 1979 to 2013.47
The data include information about many cases more than once, due to case
reopenings after closings for statistical purposes, remands from appeals, transfer of cases,

"See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Courts in Cyberspace, 46J. Legal Educ. 94 (1996).
"Information about AO case category codes is in the codebooks accompanying the data. E.g., Federal Judicial Center,
Inter-University Consortium for Pol. & Soc. Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, Study No. 25002
(2008). The civil rights cases included in the analysis consistof AO nature of suit code 440 for constitutional tortcases,
AO nature of suit codes 442 and 445 (added during the period of the study) for employment cases, AO nature of suit

code 190 for contract cases, and AO nature of suit codes 310 to 368 for personal injury tort cases. Cases coded as
employment cases, code 442, consist of cases filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006) (ADA), under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006), under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006), and under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2654 (2006) (FMLA). Actions tinder 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) can also be included in code 442 cases. AO
code 442 should include actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, or the ADA only if they were related to employment.
Many actions under these statutes should be included in AO code 440, which is labeled "Other Civil Rights." As
Clermont and Schwab note, the coding is not perfect.
[F]or example, some FMLA cases end tip in other codes, such as code #790, "Other Labor Litigation," or code
#890, "Other Statutory Actions," and so escape our count. Moreover, in fiscal year 2005, the AO peeled ADA
cases off into new codes #445, ADA-Employment, and #446, ADA-Other....
Clermont & Schwab, supra note 14, at 104 n.4. This article combines the new ADA code for employment cases, 445,
with the cases coded as 442 to create a single employment case category. Employment cases filed tinder the ADA prior
to the 2005 ADA codes should be included in the 442 category.
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 119, 127-29 (2002), more fully
describes this database and its strengths and weaknesses.

"Kevin
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Federal District Court Terminations, 1979-2013
Number of Tials with Judgments
Jury Thai Judgments

Const. tort
Contract
Employment
Tort, pers. inj.

judge Tialjudgments

Ttl.
Terminations

ForP

ForD

For P

For D

Med. Trial
Award

462,982
632,007
491,506
949,952

4,162
5,100
4,650
14,856

9,309
2,754
7,344
15,733

1,725
6,619
2,474
5,967

3,653
3,608
9,541
5,341

$101,866
$210,916
$153,463
$231,880

NOTE: P = plaintiff, D = Defendant. Table 1 reports data from all federal district court civil terminations for calendar

year 1979 through September 30, 2013. There were 8,382,535 unique terminations across all categories but the table
is limited to the four major case categories studied in this article. These categories include 2,536,447 terminations.
Cases are included only once in the analysis even if they appeared multiple times in the original AO data. The trials
with judgments include only cases in which ajudgment for plaintiff or defendant was entered after trial. Trial awards
are in inflation-adjusted 2013 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. The awards include
only cases with ajudgment for plaintiff at trial and a positive award amount.
SOURCES: Federal Judicial Center; Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

and consolidation of cases. The data analyzed below eliminate multiple observations of
cases by reducing to one observation cases filed in the same district on the same day, then
terminated in that district on the same day, and that had the same case category, procedural
stage at disposition, and outcome. Table 1 shows the total number of terminations and
aggregate information about trial outcomes. Trial win data are shown separately for jury
trials and judge trials.

III.

RESULTS

I first report results about overall terminations, trials, and trial judgments. I then explore
the patterns of trial awards over time.
A. The Declining Prominence of Civil Rights Cases on the Docket: Terminations

Figure 2 shows, on its right axis, the total number of terminations in federal district court
in each year. Total terminations have increased reasonably steadily for most of the study
period, with the exception of the mid- to late-1980s when substantial increases in the
number of terminations were followed by declines. The peak in total terminations around
1985 is largely attributable to government collection actions. The case categories that
generate the peak are "Recovery of Student Loans," "Recovery of Overpayments of Vet
Benefits," and categories related to Social Security benefits."
The left axis of Figure 2 shows the number of terminations for each of three major
case categories: employment, constitutional tort, and contract. In 1979, employment cases
and constitutional tort cases each had about 5,000 federal terminations, and contract cases

"The AO category codes are 150, 152, 153, and 863. See, e.g., Federal judicial Center, supra note 46.
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Figure 2: Number of terminations over time, federal courts by major case category.
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constituted about 15,000 out of 150,000 total terminations. Employment terminations
peaked at 23,317 in 1998, and receded to 16,789 in 2012, a decline of 28.0 percent.
Constitutional tort terminations peaked at 17,900 in 2004 and declined to 15,885 in 2012,
a decline of 11.3 percent. By 2010, both constitutional tort and employment cases had
about 15,000 terminations in the year, which increased to about 16,000 each by 2012. Data
for 2013 are not shown because the AO fiscal year includes only nine months of data for
calendar year 2013.
As percentages of total terminations, Figure 3 shows that the major two civil rights
categories combined, as reported above, peaked at about 17 percent of federal terminations in 1998 and have since declined to a combined share of about 14 percent of terminations. The decline puts them at levels of about two decades earlier. So both the absolute
numbers of employment cases and their percentage of the docket have been in steady
decline. Based on these declines, with data available through 2006, Clermont and Schwab
observed in 2009 that "results in the federal courts disfavor employment discrimination
plaintiffs, who are now forswearing use of those courts."" The employment case decline

49

Clermont & Schwab, supra note 14, at 104.
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Employment and constitutional tort cases, percent of federal court terminations.

0

1979

1982

1985

1988

1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
Calendar year of termination
Employment

- - -

-

2006

2009

2012

-Const. tort

continued and, since 2004, a decline in constitutional tort litigation in number and percent
has also occurred. Both patterns of decline leveled off after 2009. I discuss these patterns in
Section IV.

B. Trials Over Time
The vast majority of U.S. trials are in state court'o and differences between federal and state
cases should therefore be kept in mind in a study limited to federal trials. Among other
differences, prior research suggests that trial awards in federal courts are on average
substantially higher than awards in state court. 5
One theme common to federal and state courts is the decline in trials. Marc
Galanter's work on vanishing trials highlighted a long-term decline in trials across many

"oTheodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostrom & David Rottman, Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal
Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 Seattle U.L. Rev. 433, 437 tbl.1 (1996) (showing numbers of state and federal trials
for different samples of cases).
"Id. at 439 tbl.2 (showing median awards at trial).
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Figure4:

Number of trials over time, federal courts.
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case categories," a finding replicated in at least one detailed study of state courts.5 ' The
absolute number of federal civil trials had not grown since the 1960s despite substantial
increases in filings."
Figure 4 reports the number of jury trials (Figure 4a) and judge trials (Figure 4b)
from 1979 through 2012. The pattern across the major case categories is not uniform.
Figure 4b shows substantial declines in the number ofjudge trials all four categories since
1979. All four case categories are reaching a point where there is little room to decline as
there are fewer than 200 or 100 judge trials per year.
With respect to jury trials, the number of employment trials increased until about
1988, declined until the early 1990s, and then dramatically increased until 1997. The
increase in employment case jury trials after 1991 likely is attributable to the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which broadened access to jury trials in employment cases. 0 After a peak in 1997,
52

Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1

J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459 (2004).
5

Robert Moog, Piercing the Veil of Statewide Data: The Case of Vanishing Trials in North Carolina, 6J. Empirical

Legal Stud. 147 (2009).
"Galanter, supra note 52.
55

42 U.S.C.

§ 1981a

(2006).
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Figure5: Proportion of trials that are jury trials over time, federal courts by major
case category.
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the number of employment casejury trials steadily declined for the remaining 15 years. The
number of constitutional tort case jury trials had been fairly steady since the mid-1980s. The
number of tort jury trials has shown a long-term decline from the mid-1980s to 2012.
The number of contract trials has also been in long-term decline.
The differing patterns for judge and jury trials have led to a substantial shift in the
dominant mode of trial. Figure 5 shows the proportion of trials that comprise jury trials.
Judge trials in employment and constitutional tort cases are both few in number, as shown
in Figure 4, and a small proportion, less than 20 percent, of trials. The pattern over time is
almost monotonically increasing in the jury trial proportion, with a notable increase in
slope for employment trials after the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The jury proportion of tort
trials has been steady at around 70 percent, with some extremes due to consolidated trial
dispositions in aggregated actions. The proportion of tortjury trials is higher, in some years
over 90 percent, if one limits the sample to tort cases in federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction. Actions in which federal jurisdiction is based on the United States as a defendant have an average of 6.9 percentjury trials, presumably because usually no jury trial right
exists in such cases.5 6 The contract proportion of jury trials has been steady in the 40-50
percent range for about 15 years.

"Kevin

M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial byJury orJudge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 Cornell L. Rev.

1124, 1136 (1992) ("When the United States is a defendant, usually nojury right exists.").
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The likely impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on total terminations emerges in
Figures 2 and 3. Its influence on the allocation of trials between judges and juries in
employment cases is evident in Figures 4 and 5.
C. Tial Win Rates Over Time
Civil rights plaintiff win rates at trial over time have not fluctuated wildly. Figure 6 shows
that in constitutional tort cases a noticeable decline from over 30 percent plaintiff win rates
to less than 30 percent plaintiff win rates occurred around 1993 and the win rate has not
recovered. In employment cases, plaintiff win rates slowly increased to 1991, with an
increasingly favorable rate following the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Some decline occurred
after 2001 but the win rate for plaintiffs remains above its level before the mid-1990s.
The change in the employment case pattern of win rates over time appears to be
largely a function of the changing mix of judge and jury trials over time, as shown in
Figure 5. This is because, as Figure 7 shows, plaintiff win rates in jury-tried employment
cases have not noticeably increased over time. Figure 8 shows that plaintiff win rates in
judge trials also have not noticeably increased over time. What did change over time, as
Figure 5 shows, is the mix ofjudge and jury trials. Plaintiffs consistently win at higher rates
injury trials than in judge trials. Over time, judge-tried employment cases consistently show
plaintiff win rates around 20 percent. Jury-tried employment cases long hovered around 40
percent win rates with a recent decline into the 30 percent range. As the mix of trials

Figure 6:

Plaintiff trial win rate over time, federal courts by major case category.
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migrated over time toward a higher proportion of jury trials, the overall win rates in the
pooled group of trials increased without an increase in win rate within either trial category.
This variation in win rates across judge and jury trials is not present in constitutional tort
cases, in which plaintiff win rates are around 30 percent for both adjudicators.
The differences in judge and jury trial win rates in employment cases are, as Clermont
and Schwab observed, "as easy to misinterpret as they are hard to explain."" The challenge
arises because judges and juries observe different cases and the routing of cases between
them is not random.5 ' Nevertheless, evidence exists that in general judges and juries act
similarly," and judges, as well as juries, demonstrate cognitive biases that can affect decision
60

making.

Some progress toward an explanation for the differences exists. Clermont and
Schwab note that trial judges may be more demanding of plaintiffs in part because of "a well
founded fear of anyjudgments for plaintiffs being more likely reversed."" Courts of appeals
reversal rates in appeals from employment discrimination trials are asymmetric and unfavorable to plaintiffs who prevailed at trial." When plaintiffs win at trial and defendants
appeal, one large study shows the reversal rate is 43 percent, compared to a 10 percent
reversal rate when defendants win at trial and plaintiffs appeal." If appellate court pressures
cause trial courts to lean against plaintiffs in judge trials, the parties at the trial court level
may not fully perceive this. When judges disfavor plaintiffs more than expected, plaintiffs
suffer a lower trial win rate in judge trials than injury trials because juries feel no appellate
pressure. "The parties' misperceptions therefore produce a persistently lower win rate in
judge trials than in jury trials."' Whatever the cause-different treatment by judges or

"Clermont & Schwab, supra note 14, at 130.
5

'Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 56, at 1132-33.
5

1d. at 1152-53 ("The fact that jury and judge show a high degree of agreement is better supported."); Theodore
Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Waters, G. Thomas Munsterman, StewartJ. Schwab
& Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven & Zeisel's The American

Jury, 2J. Empirical Legal Stud. 171, 181 (2005) (showing consistent evidence over time thatjudges and juries agree
on conviction in criminal cases about 75-80 percent of the time).
'Chris GuthrieJeffreyJ. Rachlinski & AndrewJ. Wistrich, Inside theJudicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 777 (2001)
("Judges, it seems, are human. Like the rest of us, theirjudgment is affected by cognitive illusions that can produce
systematic errors in judgment.").
"Clermont & Schwab, supra note 14, at 130-31.
wEisenberg, supra note 20; Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 20.
mEisenberg & Farber, supra note 20, at 99 tbl.7 (showing reversal rates for the 'Jobs" category). The asymmetrical
reversal rates do not vary substantially between judge and jury trials. Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 682 tbl.6.
'Clermont & Schwab, supra note 14, at 130-31. One might expect a similar effect in constitutional tort cases, which
also stiffer anti-plaintiff asymmetric reversal rates on appeal. Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 20, at 99 tbl.7 (showing
reversal rates for the "other civil rights" (constitutional tort) category). It may be that, in constitutional tort cases, trial
judges' reaction to reversal rates is balanced byjurors' antipathy toward typical civil rights plaintiffs.Jon 0. Newman,
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Figure 9:
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different cases being routed tojudges-persistent differences in employment trial win rates
exist.
D. TrialAward Amounts

Figure 9 shifts the focus from who won at trial to the amount of the trial award in cases won
by plaintiffs." The AO data do not provide reliable estimates of the mean trial award, but
evidence suggests the data supply reasonable estimates of the median award." I therefore

Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct,
87 Yale LJ. 447, 453 (1978); Kirchoffv. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.) (saying that
plaintiffs may encounterjuries sympathetic to law enforcement defendants). The result is a lower than expected
plaintiff trial win rate before both judges and juries. In employment discrimination cases, the typical plaintiff may be
more appealing to juries than the typical constitutional tort case plaintiff, who often has had encounters with police.
Newman, supra.
'For information on settlement amounts in employment discrimination cases, see Stewartj. Schwab & Michael Heise,
Splitting Logs: An Empirical Perspective on Employment Discrimination Settlements, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 931, 942
(2011) (showing that mean employment case settlement in the Northern District of Illinois from 1999 to 2004 was
$65,950 in 2004 dollars).
66

An audit ofAO damage award data showed that the median awards in the AO data offered a reasonable upper-level
estimate of the median damages awarded to prevailing plaintiffs. The AO median damage award for tort cases
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report only the median awards for the case categories. Amounts are in inflation-adjusted
2013 dollars. Another limitation of the data is that the diminishing number of trials makes
year-by-year estimates of amounts less precise over time. For example, the estimate of award
amounts for employment cases in 1997 is based on 290 plaintiff wins at trial. In comparison,
the estimate of award amounts for 2012, the most recent full calendar year in the data, is
based on only 72 trials. It is therefore preferable to focus on the overall trend rather than
the absolute level of trial awards in any particular year.
The award trend in employment cases has fairly steadily increased since about 1993.
It is tempting to attribute this to the shift toward jury trials and the allowance of additional
damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, but the upward trend in employment awards
is at least matched by the trend in other areas of law. Each major case category has shown
median award growth well above the inflation rate. Part of this increase in contract and tort
cases is likely attributable to increases in the federal jurisdictional amount for diversity
cases. The amount increased from $10,000 to $50,000 in 1988 and to $75,000 in 1996.67 The
annual median award in the two civil rights categories is almost always lower than in tort and
contract cases.

IV.

DISCUSSION

I discuss four aspects of the results. The first involves a declining number of civil rights cases
and the limits of what one can infer from the decline. Second, with respect to employment
cases, evidence exists that behavior has in fact changed. The relative lack of success in
district court, while persisting relative to contract and tort, has shifted over time. Employment plaintiff win rates at trial have been steady in both judge trials and jury trials for at
least a decade, but trial success is an incomplete measure of plaintiff success. This is
because, in the vast majority of cases in which plaintiffs achieve success, they do so via a
payment or nonmonetary relief pursuant to a settlement agreement.68 I present evidence
that plaintiff success rates have long been improving in employment cases. The gap
in success rates between employment plaintiffs and other plaintiffs is noticeably smaller in
counseled cases. In the most recent year for which data are available, the settlement rate in
counseled employment cases does not materially differ from the settlement rate in contract
cases.
Third, the increased settlement rate in employment cases is not mirrored in constitutional tort cases. I speculate that constitutional tort attorneys have had difficulty with
anticipating the depth of the Supreme Court's antipathy to civil rights. Fourth, change is

terminated by trial was 10 percent higher ($151,000) compared to the $137,000 median award calculated from
PACER docket sheets. Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 101 (2003).
6728 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
'Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 16.
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also evident in the increasing levels of damages awarded at trial. The increasing amounts
likely do not reflect increased generosity by juries and judges and instead relate to attorney
selectivity about cases to pursue in the context of a Supreme Court that has long been
unreceptive to civil rights claims."

A. The Declining Number of Civil Rights Cases

The decline in employment cases may be attributable to potential plaintiffs reacting to low
success rates by forswearing use of the federal courts." Over time, plaintiffs may have
become less likely to sue or more likely to seek relief in state courts. The sad truth is that we
must be tentative about explanations of case filing changes affecting observable court
outcomes because we lack the essential information that should most influence filings. We
do not know how many acts of employment discrimination occurred in society that might
lead to lawsuits. We therefore cannot tell if plaintiffs have become more or less likely to file
lawsuits over time in relation to the number of acts of discrimination. Civil rights litigation
policy and other civil justice policy cannot be expected to be optimal absent such basic
information."

Some observations are nevertheless possible. With respect to employment claims, the
decline may have a contributing factor tied to an atypical increase in filings. The bulge in
employment terminations in the 1990s, which is the peak from which the number of
employment cases declined, may have been the result of a kind of filings bubble. In a short
time period, several important statutory developments occurred in the employment area.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 199072 were passed
7
in a short period of time in the early 1990s. ' The 1991 Act reversed restrictive Supreme

Court interpretations of employment discrimination statutes, allowed for jury trials in Title
VII cases, and authorized punitive damages under Title VII in cases of intentional discrimination.74 The ADA likely led to increases in employment filings to vindicate newly created
employment rights. If increased employment filings temporarily resulted from the confluence of statutory developments, the decline in employment cases evident in Figure 2 since
1997 is partly attributable to statutory developments that may have led to temporary case
increases while new rights were preliminarily explored.

"Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 14.
70

See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 14.

7

nTheodore Eisenberg, The Need for a National Civil
Urb. L.J. 17 (2010).

Justice Survey of Incidence and Claiming

Behavior, 37 Fordham

72

Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (enactedJuly 26, 1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).

7

'Act effective AtIg. 5, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2601).

"University of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2526 (2013); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 624 (2009)
(CinsburgJ., dissenting).
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With respect to constitutional tort filings, Figure 2 shows that, after two and a half
decades of increasing numbers of cases, the number suffered a long-term decline after
2004. No obvious statutory developments occurred to which to attribute the decline. It may
be that the number of actionable constitutional deprivations by police and other government officials has declined. Equally plausible is that constitutional tort plaintiffs finally
became discouraged to some degree by decades of low settlement rates, low trial win rates,
appellate level setbacks, and Supreme Court groups of five justices who have been unsympathetic to civil rights plaintiffs.
B. Changing Success Rates in Employment Cases

The AO disposition codes are limited in their capacity to yield precise estimates of settlement rates. Parties may end a settled case with various formal dispositions, such as voluntary
dismissal, express mention of settlement, or entry of judgment for a party. Some of these
formal dispositions are consistent with nonsettlement. So the AO disposition codes cannot
be expected to yield precise estimates of settlement rates.7 1 I use the AO disposition codes
that are consistent with settlement to estimate a proxy for settlement rates. There is some
noise in the estimate since some of the cases coded as settlements will have been disposed
of otherwise. Assuming that the degree of noise is not associated with particular case
categories, my estimate of settlement rates can provide information about the relative rates
of settlement across case categories and over time.
Computing a settlement rate requires a numerator estimating the number of settlements and a denominator estimating the number of cases that are candidates for settlement. The AO employs 21 disposition codes to capture the outcomes of cases.7 1 I include
cases with the following disposition codes in the settlement rate numerator: (1) judgment

'Eisenberg
7

& Lanvers, supra note 16.

1d. The AO disposition codes are:
0 = Transfer/remand: transfer to another district

11 = Transfer/remand: remanded to U.S. agency

I = Transfer/remand: remanded to state court

12 = Dismissals: voluntarily

2 = Dismissals: want of prosecution

13 = Dismissals: settled

3 = Dismissals: lack ofjurisdiction

14 = Dismissals: other

4 =Judgment on: default

15 =Judgment on: award of arbitrator

5 =Judgment on: consent

16 =Judgment on: stayed pending bankruptcy

6 =Judgment on: motion before trial

17 = Judgment on: other

7 =Judgment on: jury verdict

18 =Judgment on: statistical closing

8 =Judgment on: directed verdict

19 =Judgment on: appeal affd (magistrate judge)

9 =Judgment on: court trial

20 =Judgment on: appeal denied (magistrate judge)

10 = Transfer/remand: multidistrict litigation

See ICPSR, Inter-University Consortium for Pol. & Soc. Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base,
1970-2000, ICPSR Study No. 8429 (2001), and the codebooks for related federal court databases in subsequent years.
E.g., Inter-University Consortium for Pol. & Soc. Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2007, ICPSR
Study No. 22300 (2008). Clermont and Schwab note that "Code 3 switched in usage about 1991 from voluntary
dismissal to dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction." Clermont & Schwab, supra note 14. So I included its earlier usage with
settlement and its later usage with nonsettlements.
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Figure 10:

Proxy for settlement rate over time, federal courts by major case category.
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on: consent, (2) dismissals: voluntarily, (3) dismissals: settled, (4) dismissals: other. For the
denominator, I add the following additional disposition codes: (1) judgment on: motion
before trial, (2) judgment on: jury verdict, (3) judgment on: directed verdict, (4) judgment
on: court trial, (5) judgment on: award of arbitrator, (6) judgment on: other, (7) judgments
on appeals from magistrate judges. I do not include in the settlement rate calculation
dispositions coded as transfer to another district, remand to state court, transfer to a panel
on multidlistrict litigation, remand to a U.S. agency, stay pending arbitration, stay pending
bankruptcy, or statistical closing. Cases with these dispositions have not settled as of the
coding of the AO disposition, but they also have not had an initial alternative adjudicative
disposition. They may settle before dismissal or trial; we just do not know as of the time of
coding.
Figure 10 shows the settlement rates thus calculated for the four major case categories, with a line added for tort cases other than products liability cases. I emphasize that
these likely are not actual settlement rates. They probably overestimate the settlement rate
because some of the cases coded as settlements likely did not settle but the data do not allow
identification of those cases. The settlement rate estimates are reasonable to the extent
these falsely coded settlements appear at roughly the same rates across case categories.
On that assumption, the important information in Figure 10 is the relative position of
the case categories and the trends over time. The figure shows a clear and persistent
settlement rate hierarchy. Employment cases and constitutional tort cases settle at noticeably lower rates than contract and tort cases. The gap between the two civil rights case
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categories and other cases is broad and persists through the 35 years of available data. The
rates never approach one another.
A reasonably clear trend over time is evident in employment cases. Employment cases
have shown steadily increasing settlement rates for over 30 years. For most of the period of
the study, the increase in settlement rates has been more evident than in the other case
categories. This employment case trend could be evidence that plaintiffs' attorneys have
been getting the message. Success rates at trial do not move over time but a higher fraction
of employment cases settle over time. This is consistent with attorneys becoming more
selective about the employment cases they bring. The roughly 10 percent increase in
settlements could help explain where employment case trials have gone: they are tending
to settle, presumably because the more selective groups of cases are on average stronger
over time. This interpretation is consistent with the declining number of cases in Figure 2
as well as with the vanishing trial. The trend is less clear in constitutional tort cases, though
there have been increasing rates of settlement there since 1991.
The remaining differences in success rates between civil rights and other cases are
reduced once one accounts for pro se litigants. The AO data began in 1999 to include the
pro se status of the parties. Outside the area of prisoner litigation, constitutional tort and
employment cases have by far a higher proportion of pro se actions than other major civil
case categories. In recent years, over 35 percent of constitutional tort terminations are pro
se cases and about 20 percent of employment cases are pro se cases. In tort and contract,
less than 5 percent of terminations involve pro se plaintiffs. Cases not brought by attorneys
are less likely to take account of the low rate of civil rights plaintiff success since the pro se
litigant presumably is less able to forecast the chances of success. Lawyers can in fact make
a difference."

I reestimated settlement rates separately for pro se and counseled civil rights cases
rather than aggregate them as in Figure 10. Accounting for pro se status substantially
reduces the gap in settlement rates between civil rights and other cases. Figure 11 is similar
to Figure 10 except that it divides the employment and constitutional tort cases into pro se
and counseled components. It is limited to years since 1999 because that is when the AO data
started to consistently code pro se status. As noted, pro se cases are a trivial fraction of
contract and tort cases so I do not show separate lines for pro se litigants for those categories.
Figure 11 shows that more than half the settlement gap between civil rights and other
cases disappears once one accounts for pro se status." The gap between settlement rates in
pro se and counseled employment and constitutional tort cases is larger than the settlement

"See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, David E. Bloom & Gordon B. Dahl, Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's
Dilemma Game, 10J. Empirical Legal Stud. 399 (2013).
78

Pro se case prevalence may help explain low settlement rates, but it is not a satisfactory explanation for the low trial
success rate because such a small fraction of pro se cases reach trial. From 1999 through 2011, pro se cases comprised
510 out of 6,431 (7.9 percent) constitutional tort cases reportedly reaching a trial judgment for plaintiffs or
defendants. Pro se cases comprised 667 of 7,246 (9.2 percent) employment cases reaching trial judgment. The pro se
cases that do reach trial fare abysmally, with approximately 14 percent plaintiff win rates in both constitutional tort
and employment cases. The low proportion of trials consisting of pro se cases prevents the low pro se win rate from
substantially influencing the overall trial win rate and thus from explaining the low civil rights win rates at trial.
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Figure 11:
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Proxy for settlement rate over time, federal courts employment and constitu-

tional tort cases by pro se status.
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gap between contract cases and the civil rights case categories. A striking result in Figure 11
is that the proxy for settlement rate in counseled employment cases (the higher solid line
in the figure) was in 2010 and after about the same as the proxy for settlement rate in
contract cases. Since, as noted above, success for plaintiffs comes almost always in the form
of settlements,79 this is surprising evidence that, at least by one measure, counseled employment cases are about as successful as contracts cases.
C. Employment Cases Versus ConstitutionalTort Cases

The decreasing gap between employment case settlement rates and other case category
settlement rates is not echoed in the constitutional tort case trend. If my proxy for settlement rates is reliable, Figure 11 communicates an important change over time in the
relative success of employment cases and constitutional tort cases. While counseled employment cases approach contracts cases in settlement rates, a gap in settlement rates between
counseled employment cases and counseled constitutional tort cases has grown since 2006.
A question separable from the cause of declining filings is why such a gap has arisen and is
growing."

79

Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 16.

"'Both constitutional tort plaintiffs and employment plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees if they prevail. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988(b) (2006) (constitutional tort cases); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006) (employment cases).

26

Eisenberg

Characteristics of constitutional tort plaintiffs and defendants may contribute to the
gap. Constitutional tort cases face the additional obstacle of always challenging governmental behavior. Substantial evidence exists that governmental litigants are especially challenging opponents. Governmental litigants differ in their behavior and case processing from
other litigants."' Constitutional tort plaintiffs often have backgrounds that do not resonate
favorably with juries."
Whatever the contribution of these factors, they cannot easily explain why low success
rates persist over time. Attorneys should absorb the information that constitutional tort
cases are relatively unsuccessful and shift the merits profile of cases they choose to bring,
which in turn should shift their success rates closer to those of other civil cases. Constitutional tort lawyers have as strong an incentive to screen cases as do employment lawyers and
contingency fee tort lawyers. Civil rights plaintiffs generally cannot afford substantial hourly
rates so the lawyers do not expect payment unless they prevail. Failure carefully to screen
likely is economic suicide for civil rights attorneys just as it would be for other contingentfee attorneys. The usual likely compensating factor for lower success rates is higher awards,
but constitutional tort cases plainly do not have higher awards, as Figure 9 shows. Another
possibility is that constitutional tort attorneys are less concerned with traditional monetary
success than are other attorneys. That may explain some institutionally brought cases but
they are a small fraction of the thousands of constitutional tort actions brought each year."
What else could explain the persistent failure of a shift in constitutional tort case success
over time?
Constitutional tort attorneys may have more difficulty anticipating the Supreme
Court's willingness to narrowly interpret civil liberties, and the effect of its decisions on
lower courts. Constitutional tort cases cover a wider range of behavior than employment
cases. Much can go wrong in the workplace, but an even broader range of potential civil
rights grievances exist in encounters with governments and their officials. Constitutional
tort claims can include employment claims, but also include due process claims, First
Amendment claims, Fourth Amendment claims, other actions against police,
nonemployment discrimination claims, and other matters." Congress sometimes acts as a
check on Supreme Court decisions unfavorable to employee victims.8

5

It has not similarly

acted on behalf of constitutional tort victims.

"Theodore Eisenberg & Henry Farber, The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case Selection Model, 5Am.
L. & Econ. Rev. 94 (2003); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come Out Ahead
in Appellate Courts, in In Litigation: Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead? (Herbert M. Kritzer &Susan Silbey eds.,
2003); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 23.
2

Newman, supra note 64.

"Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 767-68.
'Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 734.
"Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-116, 105
Stat. 1071-1100 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. 111 1992)).

FourDecades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation

27

In constitutional tort litigation, the depths of five justices' antipathy to individual
rights seems to continuously evolve in surprising, unidirectional, and sometimes shocking
ways. The naked amorality of a decision such as Connick v. Thompson," in which an exonerated victim of 18 years in prison, 14 of which were on death row, cannot recover from a
city whose employees intentionally and unconstitutionally withheld exonerating evidence,
may be difficult to anticipate. Under Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of

Burlington, innocent people wrongly arrested and suspected of no violent crime can be
strip-searched and have their body cavities inspected. Under Safford Unified SchoolDistrict#1
v. Redding," innocent schoolgirls can be unconstitutionally strip-searched on the basis of
bare, unverified allegations of their classmates, yet there will be no recovery against the
searching officials due to qualified immunity. A lower court interpreted this case as not
clearly establishing the law for purposes of qualified immunity because the precise facts
claimed to support the search of another schoolgirl's bra differed from those in Safford.
"[I]s it clearly established that a student-informant's tip that she had seen plaintiff put
marijuana or marijuana paraphernalia in her bra earlier that day [is] insufficient to warrant
reasonable suspicion to search plaintiffs bra? Safford does not clearly establish this more
particularized issue."" No investigation or reasonable questioning beyond the bare allegation was required to search the innocent student.
A lawyer might assume it to be unconstitutional for a state to execute someone known
to be innocent of the crime of which he was convicted. Judges acceding to execution of
innocent persons would feel like fodder for future ex post moral historicism. How could
21st-centuryjudges in a modern democratic state look aside while an innocent person who
sought relief was executed? Yet some justices have not yet been able to find a constitutional
prohibition against executing innocent people." This unclear state of the law might protect
from liability those people responsible for the execution of people known to be innocent.91
While punitive damages awards against corporations that are too great a multiple of
compensatory awards can be unconstitutional under the due process clause, 2 somejustices
seem more reluctant to give innocent persons constitutional protection against wrongful
execution.

86131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (5-4 decision).
8

'132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (5-4 decision).

"557 U.S. 364 (2009).
"S.S. ex rel. Sandidge v. Turner Unified Sch. Dist. # 202, No. 05-2522-KHV, 2012 WL 6561525, *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 14,
2012).
90In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2009) (Scalia & Thomas,JJ., dissenting).
"But see In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010). For a review of cases addressing this
issue, see DiMattina v. United States, Nos. 13-CV-1273, 11-CR-705, 2013 WL 2632570 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2013).
2
9

See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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Many reasonable attorneys likely cannot anticipate five justices' unwillingness to
protect basic human rights such as life and intimate personal privacy. Figure 2's post-2004
decline in the number of constitutional tort cases may be evidence that attorneys are
beginning to get the message. Figure 11's growing gap between employment cases and
constitutional tort cases may suggest that they nevertheless have difficulty accepting the
degree of justices' hostility and continue to bring claims rather than accept what strikes
them as incredible. Perhaps they are psychologically incapable of accepting that they
operate in a legal system in which Connick could occur.
D. Increasing Trial Awards

Figure 9 shows that trial awards in all case categories are far outpacing inflation. This
development is consistent with lawyers' reduced willingness to bring low-value cases.
Lawyers cannot afford to bring lower-stakes claims and victims cannot persuade them to do
so. A similar phenomenon has been observed in the medical malpractice area as state laws
3
limit amounts that can be recovered.

V.

CONCLUSION

This article presents evidence that civil rights plaintiffs are making less use of federal courts
over time. Nonprisoner civil rights cases are a declining fraction of federal civil cases. Trials
continue to disappear, and evidence exists that some of the low trial rate is attributable to
increasing civil rights case settlement rates. This should be of some interest since so much
attention has focused on increased pretrial dismissal rates based on heightened pleading
standards94 as a possible source of declining trial rates.
Civil rights plaintiffs continue to enjoy less success than other civil plaintiffs, as
measured both by settlements and trial outcomes, but evidence suggests that changes are
occurring. The number of employment cases has declined over time and a proxy for
settlement rates shows increases that indicate that stronger, or at least more settleable,
employment cases are being filed. Although the number of constitutional tort cases has also
declined, a growing gap exists in the settlement rate for counseled constitutional tort and
employment cases. The broader range of activity encompassed by constitutional tort
actions, and the Supreme Court's extreme protection of governments and officials, may
have made it more difficult for constitutional tort attorneys to absorb the changes in law
that increasingly preclude recovery. This would lead constitutional tort cases to have less
success, relative to employment cases.

"Seth A. Seabury, Nicholas M. Pace & Robert T. Reville, Forty Years of Civil Jury Verdicts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud.
1 (2004).
"See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1203

(2013).

